Back Up Next ISO/IEC 27554 ISO/IEC 27554:2024 — Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Application of ISO 31000 for assessment of identity-related risk [first edition] Up Abstract ISO/IEC 27554 "provides guidelines for identity-related risk, as an extension of ISO 31000:2018. More specifically, it uses the process outlined in ISO 31000 to guide users in establishing context and assessing risk, including providing risk scenarios for processes and implementations that are exposed to identity-related risk. [ISO/IEC 27554] is applicable to the risk assessment of processes and services that rely on or are related to identity. [ISO/IEC 27554] does not include aspects of risk related to general issues of delivery, technology or security.” [Source: ISO/IEC 27554:2024] Introduction This standard facilitates the application of the ISO 31000 risk management guidelines to identity management , supporting or supplementing various identity management standards. It applies the ISO 31000 risk management process to establish the context and assess risk, suggesting some risk scenarios for the processes and implementations specifically involving identity-related risk. Scope The standard applies to the assessment, specifically, of risks associated with ‘services and transactions’ that rely on or are related to identity management, excluding risks arising generally from delivery, technology or security. It can be used in conjunction with other standards concerning controls to protect identity information. The standard succinctly explains identity-related risk definition, context and impacts. It covers the central part of the classical ISO 31000-style risk management process, excluding risk monitoring and review, and risk communication and consultation. Structure Main sections: 4: Principles - simply refers to the ISO 31000 principles 5: Framework - refers to the ISO 31000 approach 6: Process - refers to the ISO 31000 risk management process 7: Identity-related risk assessment 8: Identity-related context establishment 9: Identity-related risk identification 10: Identity-related risk analysis 11: Identity-related risk evaluation 12: Identity-related risk treatment - refers to ISO 31000 ... with appendices on related standards on risk and identity management, and “risk impact assessment”. Status The current first edition was published in 2024 . Commentary ISO 31000 remains useful, along with ISO/IEC 27005 ... begging questions about the value of another standard in this area, especially one so naively and narrowly focused. In my jaundiced opinion, the standard misrepresents the probability element of risk, equating it to the amount of control applied rather than the predicted rate of occurrence. Conflating risk and control could be seen as a fundamental problem with the approach, confusing inherent (pre-treatment) and residual (post-treatment) risk. Language/terminological issues (e.g. “B.1 Assessing the degree of impact of a consequence”) beg further questions. Rewriting this standard in plain English might help bring such issues into the disinfecting glare of sunlight. The use of ‘degrees’, ‘levels’, ‘scales’ and ‘categories’ of risk, and ‘strength’ of identity-related processes (presumably controls?) indicates a subjective and qualitative approach ... and yet the standard suggests “collapsing the distinct indicators into a single combined value” at one point and for unexplained reasons presents numeric values in a ‘Plot matrix’ ... at which point I’m afraid I completely lost the plot. Repeat after me: Ordinary arithmetic is inappropriate for ordinal numbers. Ordinary arithmetic is inappropriate for ordinal numbers. Ordinary arithmetic is inappropriate for ordinal numbers. ... Up Up Up This page last updated: 19 August 2026

FAQ about maturing your ISMS - what to do next after the implementation slog and thrill of certification Up Up Up Maturity How should we prepare for recertification? Email everyone shortly before the recertification audit, reminding them of their responsibilities towards both information security and the ISMS. Give them guidance and tips on how to conduct themselves during the audit. This is a classic security awareness opportunity! Unlike the interim surveillance audits which tend to focus on specific areas, a recertification audit will give the entire ISMS a thorough once-over. Since your ISMS has been in operation for some time (~3 years), the auditors will naturally expect to find a mature ISMS that is nevertheless moving forward, proactively responding to the inevitable changes using the C orrective A nd P reventive A ction (continual improvement or maturity) processes embedded within the ISMS. Recertification requires a formal audit. That can be tough for organisations that have let their ISMS drift or decay after the elation of their initial certification. Renewal of your certification is not a forgone conclusion! The audit’s prime focus will, of course, be to check and confirm conformity with ISO/IEC 27001 . The key issue is to determine that you are effectively managing your information security usng the framework specified in the standard. Use this checklist as a basis for planning the things you need to do before the audit: Check that your ISMS internal and external audits are fully up to date, with plans in place for future audits. Are all audit findings/observations, recommendations and agreed actions either completed and closed off, or currently in progress (with clear signs of that actually happening, in practice)? Use the results of recent audits to drive forward any necessary changes and to reinforce the concept that the audits are all about making justified improvements. (It is worth double-checking that any other similar audits covering information risks, controls and compliance/conformity are also addressed.) Collate evidence of continuing management commitment to the ISMS such as minutes of security committee meetings, decisions and actions taken, approved corrective or preventive action plans and the results of follow-up or close-out actions, and budgets. Complete a full management review of the ISMS, including your SoA and RTP. Document all findings and recommendations as preventive or corrective actions and ensure all actions are suitably initiated, allocated and managed. Try to get all significant issues closed off, or at least well under way, before the audit ... which means doing the management review in good time. Review your information risks . If there have been significant changes in the external business environment (e.g. new legal or regulatory compliance obligations, new ISO27k standards , new security partners), internal situation (e.g. reorganisations) or technologies (e.g. new platforms and application systems in IT, OT, IoT, cloud or AI), you may need to redo your information risk assessment from scratch using the documented methods, and update your RTP. All risks should be treated, in other words avoided, controlled, shared or explicitly accepted by whoever is accountable and, for significant risks, there should also be contingency plans in place in case the treatments fail. Review all the ISMS documentation (policies, standards, guidelines, procedures etc .) to ensure it is up to date, complete, formally approved/mandated/signed off, version-controlled and made available to those who need it (e.g. uploaded into the ISMS area on your intranet). Ruthlessly seek out and destroy old or outdated ISMS documentation. Get your information security awareness and training activities bang up to date and ensure a plan is in place for future activities. Ensure everyone knows where to find the ISMS policies and related materials and is aware of the content (a useful tip is to give everyone a shortcut to the information security documentation on their desktops). Ensure everyone is familiar with, and in fact actively complies with their responsibilities towards information security, for example any obligations arising from privacy legislation and relevant information security procedures. Check the documentation relating to any recent information security incidents , for instance to confirm that corrective or preventive actions were documented and duly completed. Step back from the detail to confirm that the process is operating smoothly. Review your information security metrics . Given that your ISMS has matured, are they still relevant and useful or do they need adjusting? Have you in fact been routinely reporting and measuring against them (collate recent evidence to prove it) and have any actions necessary been taken (again, check those CAPA plans)? Get yourself round each area of the business and grill likely audit interviewees (both managers and staff) regarding their part in the ISMS. Ask them some searching questions (try the auditors’ favourite “Show me...” to check that they can actually produce solid evidence substantiating whatever they claim or believe to be true) and try to find the weaknesses or concerns before the auditors turns up - not to hide them but to address them! This is invaluable preparation or training for the auditees. Tell them up front that you are not being harsh with them but are asking stiff questions to help them prepare and make the actual recertification audit go more smoothly. It’s tough love. Remember that the ISMS is dynamic, constantly adapting to changing business needs arising from evolving information risks. It will never be perfected or finished as such but, so long as it is properly managed, reviewed and fully supported by management, you will be fine. What if things change after we are certified? Stay in touch with your certification body, keeping them updated with (significant) changes and giving them the opportunity to say whether further surveillance visits or audits are in order. Building a strong working relationship with your auditors has the distinct advantage of "no surprises" on both sides, but it takes a little effort to establish and maintain the relationship, as indeed do all relationships (business or otherwise!). That depends on the nature and scale of the changes. Change is an inevitable and inherent part of the challenge. Minor changes to the ISMS are expected to occur as it naturally evolves in line with changing business needs for information security, for example through the action of various internal reviews triggering corrective and preventive actions: these should have no effect on your certification status since they are an anticipated and normal part of any ISMS. Larger scale business or organisational changes may involve more significant changes to the scope of the ISMS, for example other parts of the business being integrated with the ISMS, mergers/acquisitions or downscaling/divestments: these may be substantial enough to invalidate your original certificate without at least a surveillance visit from your certification auditors, but it's impossible to give hard-and-fast rules. Whether your ISMS changes are deemed substantial enough to invalidate your certificate, or to warrant recertification, depends on several factors such as: The scale or size of the change/s; The nature or type of change/s; The likely impact of business and organisational changes on your ISMS and/or information risks and hence the risk treatments required; How long it has been since your last certification or surveillance audit, and how long before the next one; and The certification body's policies and practices in this regard. Aside from the certification angle, you should definitely update your information asset and information risk/control registers and maybe your RTP and SoA. You may need to update your security policies and perhaps restructure the team managing and running the ISMS, which may well imply the need for a new budget. Don’t forget to check your ISMS internal audit plans too, and if appropriate adapt your metrics accordingly. How can we boost our security culture? Use suitable metrics to measure relevant parameters of your corporate security culture and drive it in the right direction, adjusting the approach and celebrating successes along the way. Try these five tips for size: Culture is heavily influenced by management, especially senior management. This is one of the key reasons that genuine senior management support is essential when implementing an ISMS ... which implies the importance of addressing senior management, helping them understand and appreciate the value of information security from the earliest opportunity. Corporate culture is also heavily influenced by powerful opinion-formers within the organisation (at any level of the hierarchy), by internal communications and networks (both formal and informal), and by the wider business/industry and national cultures in which people live. These are influenceable to varying degrees. An effective information security awareness program will identify and target the people/groups, themes, messages and styles across all these areas. Culture is an emergent property or characteristic of the organisation, demonstrated by people's actions and beliefs even when they are not being watched. This includes senior management: it is no good them saying “This awareness session is essential for everyone” if they don’t make a genuine effort to attend and actively participate. Changing corporate culture as a whole may be viewed as a massive long-term change management activity. Anyone who truly understands how to do massive change management reliably can make a fortune! It is a very complex and difficult topic, highly dependent on the specific context, plus the history leading up to the decisions to change. A serious information security or privacy incident, for example, is a classic trigger to “Do something, now! ”. Culture is dynamic: it will continue to change or evolve naturally even after it has been pushed in a certain direction, and that future evolution is not entirely controllable. This is the main advantage of rolling or continuous security awareness programs, since a single awareness event or course will gradually be forgotten and awareness levels will decay unless constantly refreshed. Covering a planned, regular sequence of security topics is a good way to make sure that the materials remain interesting and engaging, along with having excellent awareness content prepare by people who understand and empathise with the audiences. Plan to develop and enhance the security culture over the long term. Investing time and effort consistently into this will pay dividends - it is worth it. Tackle it in bite-sized chunks rather than all at once, aiming for incremental, solid improvements rather than dramatic but often short-lived effects. Which security metrics should we use? If metrics are to provide management with answers, what are their questions? The G oal- Q uestion- M etric method, coupled with the PRAGMATIC approach, is a powerful way to build a worthwhile suite of valuable information security metrics. It's tough to give simple advice on metrics: it is arguably the hardest part of what we do. But here goes. It is unrealistic to expect a standard set of security metrics, in just the same way that there is no universal set of security controls: there are simply too many variables. In time, a core set of reasonably commonplace controls and metrics may emerge from the mire but there will probably never be total consensus. Even if there was a standard set, you would still have to extend it to suit your unique situation anyway. In short, there is no way around figuring out the information risks, controls and metrics that matter to your particular organisation. Metrics-related references worth studying: ISO/IEC 27004 - the current 2016 version is useful, the long-awaited next edition promises to be even better; "IT Security Metrics " book by Lance Hayden explains the G oal-Q uestion-M etric structured approach in the IT security context; "PRAGMATIC Security Metrics " book by Krag Brotby and Gary Hinson lays out a method for systematically specifying, selecting/designing and improving information security metrics. The accompanyin website SecurityMetametrics.com has an FAQ. "Metrics: you are what you measure ", a brilliant paper by Hauser and Katz, warns about inadvertently driving the organisation the wrong way as a result of inappropriate metrics; NIST SP800-55 "Measurement Guide for Information Security" (2024) – volume 1 (identifying and selecting measures) and volume 2 (developing an information security measurement program). Well-written, up-to-date, and FREE! As you read through that lot, start thinking hard about what you and your management might really want to know about how you are doing on information security, and start defining and prioritising the collective requirements. This is the crux of your problem. Management probably wants to know things like “Are we secure enough?” or “Are we more secure now than last quarter?” and “What are our most significant information risks?” and “Why is information security so expensive?”! These are really tough questions to answer, so work hard to refine them and make them at least partly answerable. Hint: look at those parts of the ISMS which caused you the most grief when designing and implementing it. Are there parts of the ISMS that remain self-evidently painful to operate? If so, these are classic ISMS process improvement opportunities, and hopefully good places to gather metrics that will help you justify, plan and make those improvements, with the spin-off benefit that you will be making things easier for those involved. It may seem too early but it's almost certainly worth talking to your management about what they might expect during this metrics design phase. Look at what kinds of metrics they get from other management systems. Find out what they actually use versus what they get, and look for clues about what kinds of things work best in your organisation. Consider phoning your peers at other similar organisations for some good ideas. Find out what formats and styles of reporting they like best or hate most. Ask them what few reports they could really not do without. Think minimalist at the start. Next, start looking at the realities of gathering information on those things you really want to know, and continue refining your requirements. Some metrics will be straightforward (great! These are probably keepers), some will be feasible but more difficult (bear these in mind - may need more work) and some will be so awkward and/or costly that the effort required to measure them will outweigh any benefit obtained (park these, at least for now: you may revisit them later as your ISMS matures). Be careful with any existing infosec metrics: some of them may be being measured simply because they are easy to measure, such as simple counts of things (“23 malware incidents this month”, “23 million spams blocked today” or whatever). Unfortunately, such simple metrics typically don't tell management, especially senior management, anything really worthwhile. While a few may have value to the Information Security Manager as operational metrics, most are at best ‘nice to have’ numbers rather than “Oh boy, this one is in the red, we’d better turn dial ZZY to the left 20 degrees”! Most of all, avoid the temptation to list and discuss all the information security-related things you can measure, like a giant shopping list. Some of them may be worthwhile ingredients, but most will be distracting and unhelpful. Trust me, this is not an effective way to start designing your ISMS metrics. If you must have one, keep the shopping list to yourself but share the menu. Finally, towards the end of your lunchtime (!), it's time to start experimenting, trialling a few metrics, getting the data gathering, analysis and presentation processes working and getting feedback from management. Give them some ‘sample’ reports and ask them if they know what to do about the things you are reporting. This is where all your pre-work starts to pay off, hopefully. If you have chosen well, you should by now be ready to routinely report a few good metrics, and more than that use management should be using them to make decisions. Management should be saying “Ah, I see, yes, nice, let's have more of these ...” and “Mmm, that's not quite what I had in mind. I really need to know about ...”. During this stage, you will inevitably find that you need to gather more detailed ‘supporting’ metrics to underpin the high level/strategic management stuff, and you will also figure out that there are various routine/operational issues and controls within the ISMS that deserve measuring and using for day-to-day purposes by the Information Security Manager and team. Now is the time to work on defining targets. At what level, exactly, does metric 26 go ‘into the red’? Why there? Is it a point or a range? Whereabouts on the scale can we relax? Then, over the next several decades (!!), keep on refining your metrics, testing new ones, dropping the ones that aren't working and responding to changes in your ISMS, the risks and controls, the people, the fashions, the good ideas you pick up at conferences ... and extending the answer to this FAQ with your wisdom. How can I become an ISO27k consultant? Dive deep to figure out your value proposition as a consultant - not your amazing personal qualities but the valuable business benefits you bring to clients, substantially outweighing your charges. Why should clients employ you rather than your competitors, if anyone? What's in it for them? Start by studying the ISO27k standards – in particular the core set: ISO/IEC 27000 (overview & glossary) ISO/IEC 27001 (formal ISMS specification) ISO/IEC 27002 (catalogue of security controls) ISO/IEC 27003 (ISMS implementation) ISO/IEC 27004 (security metrics) ISO/IEC 27005 (risk management process) ISO27k "Lead Auditor " or "Lead Implementer " courses can be a quick way to tackle the basics, depending on the nature and quality of the course materials and the competence of the trainers ... but 'basics' is the crux of it. A few hours or days in class is barely a start. ISO/IEC 27021 describes the competencies generally expected in this area. Continue your self-development by actively researching and learning about governance, risk and control concepts. Study NIS2 , DORA , PCI-DSS , COBIT , privacy laws, COSO ERM and so on. Take a good look at the remaining ISO27k standards including ISO/IEC 27701 , plus others such as ISO 22301 and the NIST SP 800 series and other certifications such as SOC 2 and Cyber Essentials . Impress potential clients with the breadth and depth of your knowledge. Read voraciously. If you are not one already, read-up on becoming a consultant (what that entails, how to start out, key aspects, things to expect, things to do, things to avoid ...) and running a business (useful to understand clients, even if you anticipate joining an established consultancy). Aside from all that reading, real-world experience is crucial. Take on small infosec-related projects. Do research. Keep up with recent incidents, vulnerabilities and advisories. Write and publish papers. Participate actively in professional communities such as the ISO27k Foru m , LinkeDin , ISACA ENGAGE and ISSA . Seek mentorship or guidance from more experienced peers. Accumulate knowledge, experience and expertise in governance, risk and control, in security, privacy, resilience and so forth. Your competence, credibility and hence success as a consultant influences the nature and quality of your work, and vice versa . You'll know when you have gained sufficient wisdom to make a real difference in the world - and so will your peers and clients. Meanwhile, slog. Previous Up Next

Back Up Next ISO/IEC 27031 ISO/IEC 27031:2025 — Cybersecurity — Information and communication technology readiness for business continuity (second edition) Up Abstract “ISO/IEC 27031 provides guidance on ensuring that information and communication technology (ICT) is prepared to support business continuity. It outlines a framework for ICT readiness that aligns with broader business continuity objectives, helping organizations to prevent, respond to and recover from ICT-related disruptions that could impact critical operations. In today’s digital world, organizations rely heavily on ICT systems to operate, deliver services and maintain trust with stakeholders. Disruptions to these systems — from cyberattacks to system failures — can have severe consequences. ISO/IEC 27031 helps organizations build ICT resilience by integrating readiness planning into business continuity and information security practices. It ensures that ICT services can be restored within agreed timeframes, protecting operations, reputation and customer trust. This readiness is not only about internal systems but also extends to dependencies on third-party services such as cloud providers. Benefits: Supports uninterrupted business operations during ICT disruptions Strengthens alignment between ICT, security and continuity strategies Reduces recovery time and data loss after incidents Enhances organisational resilience and stakeholder confidence Integrates smoothly with ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO 22301 practices” [Source: ISO.org summary page ] Introduction ISO/IEC 27031 provides guidance on the concepts and principles behind the role of I nformation and C ommunication T echnology in ensuring business continuity. The standard: Suggests a structure or framework (a coherent set or suite of methods and processes) for any organisation – private, governmental, and non-governmental; Identifies and specifies all relevant aspects including performance criteria, design, and implementation details, for improving ICT readiness as part of the organisation’s ISMS, helping to ensure business continuity; Enables an organisation to measure its ICT continuity, security and hence readiness to survive a disaster in a consistent and recognized manner. Scope The standard encompasses all events and incidents (not just information security related) that could have an impact on ICT infrastructure and systems. It therefore extends the practices of information security incident handling and management, ICT readiness planning and services. I CT R eadiness for B usiness C ontinuity [a general term for the processes described in the standard] supports B usiness C ontinuity M anagement “by ensuring that the ICT services are as resilient as appropriate and can be recovered to pre-determined levels within timescales required and agreed by the organisation.” ICT readiness is important for business continuity because ICT is prevalent and vital: many organisations’ critical business processes (including those involved in managing incidents plus the related business continuity, disaster and emergency responses) are highly dependent on ICT. Therefore, BCM would be incomplete without adequately considering the need to protect availability and continuity of the ICT. ICT readiness encompasses: Preparing the organisation’s ICT (i.e. the IT infrastructure, operations and applications), plus the associated processes and people, against unforeseeable events that could change the risk environment and impact ICT and business continuity; Leveraging and streamlining resources among business continuity, disaster recovery, emergency response and ICT security incident response and management activities. ICT readiness should of course reduce the impact (meaning the extent, duration and/or consequences) of information security incidents on the organisation. The standard incorporates the cyclical P lan-D o-C heck-A ct Deming-style approach, extending the conventional business continuity planning process to take greater account of ICT. It incorporates ‘failure scenario assessment methods’ such as F ailure M ode and E ffects A nalysis, with a focus on identifying ‘triggering events’ that could precipitate more or less serious incidents. The SC 27 team responsible for ISO/IEC 27031 liaised with ISO Technical Committee 233 on business continuity, to ensure alignment and avoid overlap or conflict. Structure Main clauses: 6: Integration of IRBC into BCM 7: Business expectations for IRBC 8: Defining prerequisites for IRBC 9: Determining IRBC strategies 10: Determining the ICT continuity plan 11: Testing, exercise, and auditing 12: Final MBCO 13: Top management responsibilities regarding evaluating the IRBC Annex A: Comparing RTO and RPO to business objectives for ICT recovery Annex B: Risk reporting for FMEA Status The first edition was published in 2011 . The revision project ran off the rails and was cancelled in 2020, then magically rebooted. The standard was revised to cover the need for ICT support for business continuity arising from both deliberate and accidental incidents. The current second edition was published in 2025 . Commentary The value of this standard is unclear, given that ISO 22301 does such a good job in this general area while ISO/IEC 24762 covers ICT D isaster R ecovery specifically. This standard could usefully be extended beyond the ICT domain since: The ISO27k standards concern risk and security to information, not just “ICT” (a clumsy and unnecessary amplification of good old “IT” which in common usage has included comms for, oh at least 50 years); O perational T echnology (such as I ndustrial C ontrol S ystems running manufacturing plant, and assorted facilities management systems providing power, cooling etc .) is not mentioned, not even once - neither included nor excluded, just completely ignored; Information in forms or formats other than computer data can be just as important for business continuity, just as valuable and just as much at risk. For example, the loss of a critical knowledge worker, perhaps even an entire high-perfoming team of professionals, can devastate the operational capability of any department. Think September 11th, or COVID, or defection to/poaching by a competitor or startup. However, at present, the standard remains entirely ICT-focused, tech-centric. Furthermore, to avoid any hint of overlap or conflict with the excellent ISO 22300 -series standards, ISO/IEC 27031 does not replace a B usiness C ontinuity M anagement S ystem. That said, the standard orbits around “IRBC” (I CT R eadiness for B usiness C ontinuity) ... which is essentially a systematic way to manage the IT elements of business continuity, supplementing the BCMS as a whole. Although the issued standard mentions ICT resilience to - as well as recovery from - disastrous situations, the coverage on resilience (the ability for critical processes and systems to withstand as well as recover from serious incidents) is limited - another potential improvement opportunity here. It is similarly light on contingency . Contingency planning involves developing the organisation’s flexibility, capability, resources and dogged determination to cope with whatever situations actually eventuate, preparing for the uncertainties and challenges ahead. What will actually happen following an incident is contingent on the situation that occurs, its significance (reflecting its scale, nature, timing, implications for the business etc .) and the resources available (surviving!) at that point. The current standard only refers once to ‘contingency’, as a convoluted and ineptly-phrased note to the definition of [ICT] readiness. Up Up Up This page last updated: 19 August 2026

Back Up Next ISO/IEC 27018 ISO/IEC 27018:2025 — Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Guidelines for protection of personally identifiable information (PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors (third edition) Up Abstract ISO/IEC 27018 "establishes commonly accepted control objectives, controls and guidelines for implementing measures to protect personally identifiable information (PII) in line with the privacy principles in ISO/IEC 29100 for the public cloud computing environment. In particular, [ISO/IEC 27018] specifies guidelines based on ISO/IEC 27002:2022, taking into consideration the regulatory requirements for the protection of PII which can be applicable within the context of the information security risk environment(s) of a provider of public cloud services ... The guidelines in [ISO/IEC 27018] can also be relevant to organizations acting as PII controllers.” [Source: ISO/IEC 27018:2025] Introduction This standard provides guidance aimed at ensuring that cloud service providers (such as Amazon and Google) offer suitable information security controls to protect the privacy of their customers’ clients by securing P ersonally I dentifiable I nformation entrusted to them. See also ISO/IEC 27017 covering the wider information security angles of cloud computing, aside from privacy. The standard development project had widespread support from national standards bodies plus the C loud S ecurity A lliance . Scope ISO/IEC 27018 intends to be “a reference for selecting PII protection controls within the process of implementing a cloud computing information security management system based on ISO/IEC 27001 , or as a guidance document for organisations for implementing commonly accepted PII protection controls” . The standard is primarily concerned with public-cloud computing service providers processing PII . “A public cloud service provider is a 'PII processor' when it processes PII for and according to the instructions of a cloud service customer” [according to the DIS version]. It does not officially cover PII principals (i.e. individuals processing their own PII in the cloud, for example using Google Drive) or PII controllers (i.e. cloud service customers processing PII of their clients/customers/employees and others in the cloud), although they clearly share many concerns and have an interest in the cloud service provider’s privacy controls. The standard interprets rather than duplicates ISO/IEC 27002 in the context of securing personal data processed in the cloud. An annex extends 27002, for example advising cloud service providers to advise their customers if they use sub-contractors. ISO/IEC 27000 , ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 are cited as ‘normative’ (i.e. essential) standards, along with ISO/IEC 17788:2014 “Cloud computing - overview and vocabulary” (withdrawn - replaced by ISO/IEC 22123-1:2023 , a legitimate free download from ISO) and ISO/IEC 29100 “Privacy framework” (another free download!). Structure Main clauses: 4: Overview 5: Organizational controls 6: People controls 7: Physical controls 8: Technological controls Annex A: Public cloud PII processor extended control set for PII protection Annex B: Correspondence between this document and the first edition ISO/IEC 27018:2019 Status The first edition was published in 2014 . The second edition (a minor revision) was published in 2019 . The current third edition was published in 2025 , having been updated to reflect ISO/IEC 27002:2022 and offering an ‘extended control set’ aligned with ISO/IEC 29100:2024 Commentary The standard builds on ISO/IEC 27002 , expanding on its generic advice in a few areas, and referring to the OECD privacy principles that are enshrined in several privacy laws and regulations around the globe. In most sections, it simply says: “The objectives specified in, and the contents of, clause [whatever] of ISO/IEC 27002 apply.” The expansions or additions are straightforward - no surprises here. Up Up Up This page last updated: 19 August 2026

Back Up Next ISO/IEC 27033-3 ISO/IEC 27033-3:2010 Information technology — Security techniques — Network security — Part 3: Reference networking scenarios — threats, design techniques and control issues (first edition) Up Abstract ISO/IEC 27033 part 3 “describes the threats, design techniques and control issues associated with reference network scenarios. For each scenario, it provides detailed guidance on the security threats and the security design techniques and controls required to mitigate the associated risks. Where relevant, it includes references to ISO/IEC 27033-4 to ISO/IEC 27033-6 to avoid duplicating the content of those documents. The information in ISO/IEC 27033-3:2010 is for use when reviewing technical security architecture/design options and when selecting and documenting the preferred technical security architecture/design and related security controls, in accordance with ISO/IEC 27033-2. The particular information selected (together with information selected from ISO/IEC 27033-4 to ISO/IEC 27033-6) will depend on the characteristics of the network environment under review, i.e. the particular network scenario(s) and ‘technology’ topic(s) concerned. Overall, ISO/IEC 27033-3:2010 will aid considerably the comprehensive definition and implementation of security for any organization's network environment.” [Source: ISO/IEC 27033-3:2010] Introduction Using a set of 'reference scenarios' (worked examples), part 3 demonstrates how to identify, evaluate and treat typical information risks in the networking security context. Scope Part 3 intended to“define the specific risks, design techniques and control issues associated with typical network scenarios” [Source: ISO/IEC 27033-1] . Structure Main clauses: 7: Internet access services for employees 8: Business to business services 9: Business to customer services 10: Enhanced collaboration services 11: Network segmentation 12: Networking support for home and small business offices 13: Mobile communication 14: Networking support for travelling users 15: Outsourced services Annex A: Example Internet use policy Annex B: Catalogue of threats Status The current first edition of part 3 was published long, long ago in 2010 ... and confirmed unchanged in 2018. Commentary This standard: Discusses threats, specifically, rather than all the elements of risk. Refers to other parts of ISO/IEC 27033 for more specific guidance. This 2010 standard is way out of date (as it was back in 2018 when it was confirmed), despite ironically noting "the evolving nature of technology". There is no mention of 'cloud', for instance. Not one. None. Zilch. Zero. Nor 'zero trust', for that matter, nor '*aaS'. 'AES' is in there, however, so it's not totally prehistoric. Up Up Up This page last updated: 19 August 2026

Back Up Next ISO/IEC 27037 ISO/IEC 27037:2012 — Information technology — Security techniques — Guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence (first edition) Up Abstract “ISO/IEC 27037:2012 provides guidelines for specific activities in the handling of digital evidence, which are identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of potential digital evidence that can be of evidential value. It provides guidance to individuals with respect to common situations encountered throughout the digital evidence handling process and assists organizations in their disciplinary procedures and in facilitating the exchange of potential digital evidence between jurisdictions. ISO/IEC 27037:2012 gives guidance for the following devices and circumstances: digital storage media used in standard computers like hard drives, floppy disks, optical and magneto optical disks, data devices with similar functions; mobile phones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), Personal Electronic Devices (PEDs), memory cards; mobile navigation systems; digital still and video cameras (including CCTV); standard computer with network connections; networks based on TCP/IP and other digital protocols; and devices with similar functions as above. The above list of devices is an indicative list and not exhaustive.” [Source: ISO/IEC 27037:2012] Introduction This standard provides guidance on identifying, gathering/collecting/acquiring, handling and protecting/preserving digital forensic evidence i.e. “digital data that may be of evidential value” for use in court. The fundamental purpose of the ISO27k digital forensics standards is to promote good practice methods and processes for forensic capture and investigation of digital evidence. While individual investigators, organisations and jurisdictions may well retain certain methods, processes and controls, it is hoped that standardization will (eventually) lead to the adoption of similar if not identical approaches internationally, making it easier to compare, combine and contrast the results of such investigations even when performed by different people or organisations and potentially across different jurisdictions. One of the most critical issues in forensic investigations is the acquisition and preservation of evidence in such a way as to ensure its integrity. As with conventional physical evidence, it is crucial for the first and subsequent responders (defined as “Digital Evidence First Responders” and “Digital Evidence Specialists”) to maintain the chain of custody of all digital forensic evidence, ensuring that it is gathered and protected through structured processes that are acceptable to the courts. More than simply providing integrity, the processes must provide assurance that nothing untoward can have occurred. This requires that a defined baseline level of information security controls is met or exceeded. Digital forensic evidence can come from any electronic storage or communications media such as smartphones and other smart devices, computers, game consoles etc . plus online/network/cloud storage. By its nature, digital forensic evidence is fragile - it can be easily damaged or altered due to improper handling, whether by accident or on purpose. Prior to the release of ISO/IEC 27037, there were no globally-accepted standards on acquiring digital evidence, the first step in the process. Police have developed their own national guidelines and procedures for the acquisition and protection of electronic evidence. However, this creates issues when cross-border crimes are committed since digital forensic evidence acquired in one country may need to be presented in the courts of another. Evidence that may have been acquired or protected without the requisite level of security may be tainted or legally inadmissible. Scope The standard provides detailed guidance on the identification, collection and/or acquisition, marking, storage, transport and preservation of electronic evidence, particularly to maintain its integrity. It defines and describes the processes through which evidence is recognized and identified, documentation of the crime scene, collection and preservation of the evidence, and the packaging and transportation of evidence. The scope covers ‘traditional’ IT systems and media rather than vehicle systems, cloud computing etc. The guidance is aimed primarily at first responders. Every country has its own unique legislative system. A crime committed in one jurisdiction may not even be regarded as a crime in another. The challenge is to harmonize processes across borders such that cybercriminals can be prosecuted accordingly. Therefore, a means to allow and facilitate the exchange and use of reliable evidence (i.e. an international standard on acquiring digital evidence) is required. “Digital evidence”, meaning information from digital devices to be presented in court, is interpreted differently in different jurisdictions. For the widest applicability, the standard avoids using jurisdiction-specific terminology. It does not cover analysis of digital evidence, nor its admissibility, weight, relevance etc . It also does not mandate the use of particular tools or methods. Structure Main clauses: 5: Overview 6: Key components of identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence 7: Instances of identification, collection, acquisition and preservation Annex A: Digital Evidence First Responder core skills and competency description Annex B: Minimum documentation requirements for evidence transfer Status The current first edition was published in 2012 and confirmed unchanged in 2018. Commentary This standard concerns the initial capturing of digital evidence. In addition: ISO/IEC 27041 offers guidance on the assurance aspects of digital forensics e.g. ensuring that the appropriate methods and tools are used properly. ISO/IEC 27042 covers what happens after digital evidence has been collected i.e. its analysis and interpretation. ISO/IEC 27043 covers the broader incident investigation activities, within which forensics usually occur. ISO/IEC 27050 (in 4 parts) concerns electronic discovery which is pretty much what the other standards cover. British Standard BS 10008:2008 “Evidential weight and legal admissibility of electronic information. Specification.” may also be of interest. I don’t understand why SC 27 maintains several distinct forensics standards, covering different aspects of forensics, when they are in reality complementary parts of the same process. A properly structured multi-part standard would make more sense to me, with an overview part 1 explaining how the jigsaw pieces fit together. Up Up Up This page last updated: 19 August 2026

Back Up Next ISO/IEC 27034-6 ISO/IEC 27034-6:2016 — Information technology — Security techniques — Application security — Part 6: Case studies (first edition) Up Abstract ISO/IEC 27034 part 6 “provides usage examples of ASCs for specific applications. NOTE Herein specified ASCs are provided for explanation purposes only and the audience is encouraged to create their own ASCs to assure the application security.” [Source: ISO/IEC 27034-6:2016] Introduction Part 6 provides examples of how A pplication S ecurity C ontrols might be developed and documented. Scope Part 6 concerns the handling of application security in the course of software development. Structure Main clauses: 5: Security guidance for specific applications Annex A: XML examples for case studies in 5.2 Status The current first edition of part 6 was published in 2016 and confirmed unchanged in 2022. Commentary Case studies demonstrate the feasibility of this highly structured, formal approach that is being used successfully by some major software developers. Up Up Up This page last updated: 19 August 2026

FAQ about auditing, testing, reviewing and evaluating things in the context of ISO27k Up Up Up Assurance How to conduct an ISMS internal audit (in detail)? Personally, I use mind-maps to help me think through the likely risks and anticipated controls, and to structure each audit job. Process diagrams, flowcharts, swim lane charts, Ishikawa (fishbone, cause-and-effect) diagrams and so on may suit you better. Don’t forget to include sufficient contingency time in your plan ... for those things that don't go entirely as planned. Start by studying ISO 19011 , the ISO standard for auditing management systems, for general advice, plus ISO/IEC 27006 , ISO/IEC 27007 and ISO/IEC TS 27008 for more specific advice on ISMS audits, plus the core ISO27k standards about the ISMS itself. Your Internal Audit Department, if you have one, is an obvious place to seek help (e.g . audit policies and procedures) and ISACA is another recommended resource. The typical audit process goes something like this: Agree the audit scope (what's in and just as importantly what's out of scope), purpose/objectives and criteria for the audit (e.g. man-days or elapsed time available, expected audit deliverables) with audit and maybe business management. [Each audit normally flows from some form of risk-based audit planning and scheduling.] Review the situation and the background to the audit, considering the risks potentially of concern in the area of scope and any concerns or loose ends arising from prior audit reports, management reviews etc . You may need to do some initial scoping/feasibility work on the job, and check any previous ISMS-related audit reports and maybe the audit files to get a feel for the likely problem areas. Either way, try not to lose sight of your independence, in other words think about the risks and issues in broad, fairly theoretical terms, assuming nothing about the controls that one would naturally expect to be in place ... just in case they aren't. Draw up an audit work program (an I nternal C ontrols Q uestionnaire, checklist or whatever you call it) showing the issues you intend to check and indicating in what level of detail you will check them. Leave yourself some space for notes to record findings and your initial analysis while things are still fresh in your mind. Consider and plan the audit fieldwork i.e. how you will actually check the things of interest on your ICQ through interviews, observation, data analysis, sampling, testing ... Draw up your shopping list of things and information you will need, people you want to speak to etc . and reconfirm the timescale for the audit assignment: you will often have lined yourself up more work than you can reasonably complete in the time available, so revisit the scoping for clues about management’s priorities for the audit. Identify and contact your lead contact/s for the audit and work with them to line up and prepare for the fieldwork, hopefully sorting out many of the items on your shopping list (e.g. arranging initial interviews, obtaining reports, policies etc . that you will want to review). It's best to contact the contact as early as possible in the process: good contacts can help with the planning too, but be cynical if they try to steer you away from anything! Perform the audit fieldwork, keeping your contact up to date with developments, preliminary findings, concerns, any problems conducting the audit etc . A helpful audit contact can act as a sounding board for emerging audit concerns and possible recommendations, and a source of additional inside knowledge. Work systematically through your ICQ. Analyse the findings, generating a list of priority issues (must-fix items) and ‘additional items’ (often included in reports just for information, but that depends on audit working practices). My preference is to draw up a SWOT analysis identifying the key S trengths, W eaknesses, O pportunities and T hreats - no more than about 5 or 6 items per category to keep things at a high level. You may need to revisit certain parts of the ICQ to confirm significant findings, collect additional evidence, and generally substantiate the key issues. Stay objective, for instance basing your work on facts backed by audit evidence . Draft an audit report with recommendations addressing the priority issues, and get this reviewed within the audit function, or by your manager at least. A ‘file review’ is normal in order to confirm that everything reportable is being duly reported, and everything reported is traceable to sound audit evidence. This requires sorting and indexing the audit evidence, cross-referencing it to the ICQ etc . Work with senior and middle management to clarify any audit concerns and recommendations, and to align priorities and timescales with business objectives and constraints. Normally, as part of this phase, you would present and discuss the SWOT analysis, the draft audit report and the key findings and recommendations with client management. Discuss the recommendations, and seek their outline agreement to the actions arising. It's important to give management some time and space to consider anything serious, particularly if they would have to juggle priorities and assign resources to this. You may need to meet senior managers individually to explain and discuss things further, and sometimes to consider alternative approaches (business managers generally know best how to implement improvements, but you should by now have established your credibility and hence have influence). Finalise the report, ideally including a firm action plan with dates and responsibilities for resolving the issues and even better something from management formally confirming that they accept the report and intend to carry out the recommendations. ssue the report to the appropriate people. It may help to create and circulate a brief executive summary (maximum 1 or 2 sides) for senior management but make the full report available to those who need the details. Decide whether and how to follow-up to ensure that the action plans are in fact completed properly, if this is audit's responsibility [it varies between organisations: in some, management is entirely responsible for completing recommended and agreed actions]. In others, management request audit's help to check for completion.] Follow-up and if necessary escalate any outstanding issues to (more) senior management. If appropriate, revisit the findings and risks to confirm if the issues raised are still of concern, and apply pressure through management to get the job done. Close the audit file. Prune out the irrelevant information, keeping relevant evidence, reports, feedback from management etc . and making notes for the next ISMS audit. Store the audit file securely as the contents are probably somewhat sensitive. For pure conformity assessments (such as ISO/IEC 27001 certification audits), the key risks and issues relate to non-conformity with mandatory requirements laid out in the standards of course, and ISO/IEC 27006-1 may help. For pure management systems audits, the focus is self-evidently on the management system and processes, which are driven by ISO/IEC 27001, and ISO/IEC 27007 may help. For more broadly-scoped ISMS internal audits, there may well be other more or equally important issues worth reviewing for the business ... like for example whether the information security controls are adequate in practice (see ISO/IEC TS 27008), and whether various obligations towards third parties (such as customers, partners, regulatory authorities or owners) are satisfied (e.g. is the ISMS a cost-effective use of corporate resources?). I work in Internal Audit Department. Do we have to perform ISMS internal audits as per clause 9? This is an opportunity for all those involved. Sit down with those in charge of the ISMS to talk about what they have done, what they anticipate you doing now, and how they see the relationship developing over time. As an independent function, you do not answer to the ISMS team and they cannot force you to provide information or do things for them in a certain way. However, as Internal Audit, you work for - or at least in conjunction with - the organisation's senior management and are presumably be expected to support the organisation's strategic aims. If the ISMS has management's full support [a not insignificant assumption - something your audit might want to establish!], it is reasonable for them to invite you to audit it thus fulfilling the requirements for ISMS internal audits. However, the manner in which you perform the audit, the way you plan and perform it, is really your domain. For example, you would need to develop the audit program, schedule the work, assign suitable auditors etc . How much advance notice and other information to give them is up to you, although in the interests of making the audit as effective as possible, I would try to work with them on this. Right now, they are probably quite sharply focused on conformity with ISO/IEC 27001 and are simply trying to fulfil the standard's requirement for internal ISMS audits, which you should read to understand. They may not appreciate your role in life, nor the value you can bring to the party. It sounds as if they are perhaps unfamiliar with the way you normally work, and probably have a naïve view of how you would approach the job (e.g . simplistic/crude conformity assessment or compliance auditing). They almost certainly presume that your audit would be entirely constrained within the scope of their ISMS whereas you would probably be interested in the wider picture, potentially including information security and information risk management issues elsewhere in the organisation. On a more positive note, it makes a pleasant change for auditors to be 'invited-in' by prospective auditees! This could be an ideal opportunity for Internal Audit to get to work on the ISMS and make positive recommendations for improving the organisation's information security controls, risk management, compliance/conformity and governance (at least within the scope of the ISMS for now), knowing that the implementation team and hopefully management has the incentive to address any issues quickly in order not to stall or preclude the certification. Personally, however, I would be cautious about being too ambitious with your audit at this stage since recommending major changes could be seen as derailing the ISMS project, while a softly-softly approach would leave the door open for further ISMS audits supporting their PDCA-based internal management review and improvement activities. With an effective ISMS in place, you can expect the information security situation to be more stable as it comes under better management control, and then to improve gradually of its own accord. You have a part to play in making this happen as effectively and efficiently as possible. In particular, your independent viewpoint gives you the advantage of making sure that the ISMS is not blind-sided by some unanticipated issue that the ISMS management team was unaware of, and the chance to promote generally accepted good risk/security management practices based on the standards or other sound sources. An ISMS is a long-term corporate commitment to professional information security management and that surely has to be a positive thing, both for audit and for the rest of the organisation. Consider ISMS auditor training with support from technology auditors. How to confirm the status of controls in the SoA? You might like to hold off the certification auditors for a few months after the ISMS is considered “implemented”, in order to build up your stock of evidence demonstrating that the processes are operating correctly, in addition to letting the processes settle down a bit. Your implementation project plans should therefore show a short hiatus between implementation and certification, supplementing the usual contingency allowance in case of implementation delays. Auditors should check that identified ISMS controls are truly in operation, not merely listed as such in some dusty old policy manual or intranet website. Evidence is key! For example, you need to have experienced at least one incident to confirm that the incident management process actually works in practice and is not just a fine set of words in your ISMS policies. This is analogous to the situation with ISO 9000 where the auditors typically check that genuine quality issues have been identified through quality reviews etc ., addressed following the stated QA processes and resolved, not just that you say you will deal with them in a certain way should they ever happen. Clearly, it is not reasonable to wait until there has been a total disaster to check that your contingency planning processes function correctly - there are pragmatic limits to this principle, thankfully! But you should probably have completed at least one contingency planning exercise or D isaster R ecovery test including the vital post-test washup to identify things that need fixing. For common information security controls that are in action all the time (e.g. antivirus, access controls, user authentication, security patching, backups), the auditors will want to check the evidence (they may call them “artefacts” or “records”) relating to and proving their operation. Remember, an ISMS is for life, not just for the certificate. How do we tell whether the 'control purposes' are achieved? This is primarily a risk management or business decision for the Information/Risk Owners who are accountable for protecting and exploiting 'their' information assets. Information security and risk management people can advise them, of course, but should avoid going beyond their brief and, in effect, accepting accountability for information security matters that rightfully belong to management. Achievement of the purposes or objectives of your security controls can be determined by management, by auditors or by others checking the controls to decide the extent to which the corresponding objectives are satisfied. HINT: such checks are tricky if the control purposes/objectives are unclear, general, ambiguous, uncertain, inadequately considered and specified, or totally unstated. Start there! Security incidents obviously suggest that the controls are less than perfect ... so one way to identify controls worth a close look is to rummage through your information security incident records and reports for evidence or hints about missing or ineffective controls. Make a special effort to tease out and re-evaluate longstanding issues. Don’t be hoodwinked into ignoring issues that “have always been a problem” or “will never be solved”: if they are in scope of the audit or review, they are almost certainly worth checking. An experienced, competent IT auditor’s unjaundiced eye and techniques for assessing and reporting on such issues might just unblock the drains and help the organisation achieve real progress. Control purposes that are unsatisfied are obvious candidates for security improvement, but the prioritisation or urgency or necessity of that work depends on the significance of the risk and the degree of nonconformity. For example, a control intended to minimise malware risks may require “up-to-date antivirus software running on all applicable systems”. The antivirus software used, the updating process, the range of systems to be protected, and the realities of implementing the control on a wide range of systems mean that some systems may not be fully protected right now for a variety of practical reasons, but so long as all the main/most important systems and a large proportion of the remainder are adequately protected, the organisation may (or may not) be willing to accept the residual risk. Management may even make a conscious risk management decision not to insist on full 100% implementation of antivirus if the costs of doing so on every single system outweigh the business benefits. Will certification auditors audit our security controls? Regardless of whether or not the certification auditors audit the controls, the organisation should still be checking its own information security controls routinely, typically through management reviews and internal audits. The certification auditors may therefore ask to see some evidence that you are routinely checking your controls, for example management review or internal audit reports, along with agreed action plans to address any improvement recommendations. To a limited extent, yes, but the primary purpose of the certification audit is to confirm whether you have an effective, conformant ISMS in operation, not whether you have secured the information. It’s a subtle but important difference. As Patrick Morrissey put it on the ISO27k Forum : “An ISO/IEC 27001 certificate does not mean that your organisation is secure. It states that your ISMS is working ” In principle, if you have an effective, fully-conforming ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS in operation, then the ISMS (not the ISO27k standards, nor the auditors) should ensure that there are adequate security controls in place. This approach also means that strictly speaking you needn’t necessarily have a completely comprehensive suite of information security controls to pass the certification audit, depenging on the continual improvement elements of the ISMS to drive through the remaining controls. The vital concern is that, through the ISMS, the organisation should have information risk and security under management control, proactively directing and systematically improving it. The certifications auditors will want to undertake some substantive testing of the information security controls to confirm that you are in fact doing what you say you are doing. They will seek evidence that various ISMS processes are operating correctly as documented and in some cases that will involve confirming that specific security controls are, in fact, operational. Will the certification auditor check our ISMS internal audit processes? How? Take it easy, don't fret! Like taking an examination, the audit should go smoothly if you have done your homework. Preparing your paperwork in advance of the auditor's visit will help you both. Sort out your ISMS policies, audit plans, audit files, audit methods, audit reports etc. - get them straight and be ready to offer relevant information promptly if/when the auditor asks for it. Being well organised and helpful makes the auditor’s job easier, reduces stress and increases confidence in how you conduct your internal audits. Assuming they represent an accredited certification body that has adopted ISO/IEC 27006 , the certification auditor/s will have been trained and will act professionally, diligently checking conformity with the ISO/IEC 27001 standard following a standardised audit process derived from the ISO/IEC auditing and certification standards. ISMS internal audits are a relatively small but quite important element of the ISMS in terms of continuous improvement and assurance, so you can expect the auditor to explore your internal audit practices a little, more or less depending on how much time they have and how much risk they consider is associated with the internal audits as compared to other aspects of the ISMS. A certification auditor’s prime objective is self-evidently to check your organisation’s conformity with the standard’s formal specifications, so at its most basic they will look at what ISO/IEC 27001 specifies for ISMS internal audits under clause 6 and ask you to demonstrate how you do it, using the evidence from past ISMS internal audits as proof. A good auditor will probe your ISMS audit plans, procedures and report/s, exploring aspects such as: How you audited: did you perform the audit in accordance with your own audit policy/standard/process? Are your ISMS internal auditors competent (what are their qualifications and experience at ISMS or other types of audit)? Are they truly independent of the areas being audited (independence is the critical distinction between audits in clause 9.3 of ISO/IEC 27001 and management reviews in 9.2)? What you audited: did the scope of the audit match that of the ISMS, or was it more limited in scope, in which case are you planning to fill in the gaps later? What you found : this will give the auditor clues about the state of your ISMS and may identify issues/concerns deserving further investigation; What was the outcome , in other words what did the audit achieve? Did all agreed audit recommendations (including corrective actions arising from non-conformities but possibly also more creative improvement suggestions) get fully actioned and signed-off on time and was your ISMS actually improved? More generally, how does management react and respond to audits? Do they take them seriously? Do ISMS internal audits add value to the organisation? Listen carefully to any summing up or findings or recommendations the auditor makes as there may well be some helpful suggestions about how to improve your ISMS, and if they are stated by an independent, competent external auditor, they tend to carry weight with management. Even if the final audit report officially says “No issues, full conformance”, the auditor may raise minor concerns, snags or improvement suggestions informally. A good auditor will also compliment your organisation on certain aspects of its ISMS, and those kinds of comment make good security awareness materials. It's nice to be given a clean bill of health and to be certified, but a positive comment about something your organisation is doing well can really make someone's day! What if we dispute the findings or have issues with the auditors? Auditors and auditees are mere mortals. We all have our ‘off days’. Handling disputes sensitively can make a huge difference, for example by focusing on the factual evidence and explicit requirements from the standard rather than the personalities and subjective opinions, passions or prejudices of those involved. It’s perfectly reasonable to ask “Show me” - and that goes equally for both auditees and auditors (e.g. if an auditor is asking you for or to do something that you do not believe is required by the standard, ask them which clause allegedly states the requirement and study it carefully). Avoid highly emotive words such as “incompetent”. If it gets fraught, take a break. If all else fails, clients can choose different certification bodies, and certification bodies do not have to bid for every single sales opportunity ... Certification auditors hold almost all the cards in respect of certification audits. To a large extent, what they say goes since they can steadfastly refuse to issue a certificate if they believe your organisations does not satisfy a mandatory requirement. ISO/IEC 27001 certification auditors must audit strictly against the formal specifications in the standard (no more, no less). The accreditation process, plus the standards relating to audit processes and certification, are designed to ensure that that is exactly what happens. The whole certification scheme hinges on it. Any doubt that the certification auditors have followed proper procedures and audited strictly against the formal requirements could discredit the issued certificates and, by implication, all of ISO27k . Concerns about certification audits are substantially more significant than for internal audits, far more than for internal management reviews or informal assessments. If a client has a genuine concern about a certification audit finding, recommendation, or auditor, they should first discuss it with the auditor and/or the assignment manager. Most things can be addressed at this informal level, with reference to the relevant standards, procedures and audit evidence. This happens fairly often in practice. Discussion and clarification of this nature is a normal part of any audit. Thankfully it is usually the end of the matter: although one or both parties may feel a little aggrieved, they normally reach “an understanding” - a delicate agreement or a truce at least - and move on. If the concern has not been resolved or cannot be taken further at the informal level (for example, the client believes the auditor is incompetent or misguided or plain wrong about something, but the auditor and/or the audit manager disagrees), they can complain formally to the audit company senior management about the situation and try to negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement. They should of course expect a robust response from the auditor and the company management (including the re-examination and re-presentation of the audit evidence and analysis), but if there is merit to the complaint, the audit company should have an internal process for dealing responsibly with it. It may be handled as a supplier-customer complaint, or as an audit issue, or a certification issue, or a legal issue (more below) or all of the above. This is quite rare but I'm quite sure it happens. I believe partners in audit partnerships are jointly liable for their work, so they will take complaints seriously if they are raised to that level, but the potential conflict of interest is obvious. If that complaint process fails - for example if the response is still unsatisfactory to the client, or if they feel they have not been treated professionally - they can potentially complain to the accreditation body that accredits the certification company. To get anywhere, the client would need to provide sound evidence concerning the dispute, essentially having to prove that the certification company and/or its auditors are not worthy of being accredited. The accreditation body should have a formal procedure for dealing with such complaints. I personally have never heard of such a case, but it's conceivable. The client can also complain to the professional bodies that certify and represent individual auditors - for example ISACA for CISA-qualified auditors. Again, they are likely to get a robust response from the professional body who will probably have a standard process to review the complaint, assessing evidence from both sides ... before naturally siding with the auditors, their members (!). It would take very strong, hard evidence of professional misconduct or incompetence to persuade them to find against their members, coupled with a highly professional ethics or professional standards committee. I am aware of occasional complaints of this nature, but most probably never see the light of day. Vanishingly few cases go beyond a temporary suspension of the member concerned, but expulsion is the ultimate threat. At some point in this escalation, the dispute is likely to be handed to the lawyers, implying that they will look at the standards, contracts, policies, procedures and so forth with a strict legal eye, as well as assessing the evidence relating to the dispute. Any ambiguity in ISO/IEC 27001 that led to the dispute will be brought to the fore, with each side's auditors making their case. Ultimately, it may come down to the opinion of a judge in court. It would be an extremely serious matter if a dispute ever got to this stage, clearly, since losing accreditation would be a huge commercial setback to an audit or certification company, as well as a knock to the accreditation and auditor professional bodies (since it is implied that they should not have accredited or certified the auditors) and again to ISO27k as a whole. I've heard that auditors may insist that certain Annex A controls are 'necessary'. Is that so? For bonus marks, write-up this situation as a case study or example for use in your risk workshops and awareness materials concerning risk management, assurance, conformity/compliance, certification, incident management and governance. For extra kudos, tell the ISO27k Forum about your experience and any learning points worth sharing. It might be true, or it may be just an urban myth - possibly just a misunderstanding on the part of the auditor or auditee about particular concerns, or perhaps the result of an inept, incompetent or ignorant auditor failing to appreciate the true purpose of Annex A and the associated formal requirements in ISO/IEC 27001 . Anyway, if you honestly feel there is a risk of being pulled-up by the auditor for not adopting the Annex A controls, then analyse and treat it. It's just another information risk after all. You have at least a dozen risk treatment options: Studying the standard/s and fulfilling the formal requirements, avoiding the more serious risk of nonconformity; Choosing competent, well-trained and qualified auditors from a properly-accredited certification body, ideally one recommended by trustworthy colleagues, and checking their credentials; Explicitly contracting with them "to assess and certify conformity with the formal requirements of ISO/IEC 27001:2022" (using a form of words approved by your Procurement pros and lawyers); Actively managing the audit assignment and process (including the stage 1 pre-audit) such that the auditors are crystal clear from the outset about their conformity assessment role and your explicit requirements and expectations in that regard, as stated in the contract; Gathering evidence about the audit process, findings, concerns, issues, auditor statements etc ., providing factual materials to consider and address if there are issues (auditing the auditor!); Informing, readying/pre-warning and engaging your own management to help deal with any issues that may arise, perhaps seeking their advice if they have experience in this area; Raising an incident report - using your ISMS process - to deal with a dubious audit finding, nonconformity or other issue; Appealing/escalating/complaining to the certification body's management in case of disputes with incompetent, inept, ignorant or over-assertive/aggressive auditors; Appealing/escalating/complaining to the accreditation body if the certification body is incompetent and ; Complaining to the professional bodies who trained and certified incompetent auditors, including those responsible for any claimed qualifications (such as CISA from ISACA, or Lead Auditor courses from numerous training companies); Doing nothing - accepting the risk, winging-it, taking a chance to pursue the opportunity; Some combination of the above, or something else e.g . can you share the risk with the certification body by raising and discussing your concerns during the contracting process? The underlying message of those bullets is that you have choices. You should consider the risk, decide which risk treatment options you feel are most appropriate, and implement them. Can we demand that key suppliers are certified against ISO/IEC 27002? Study the standards! The answers are there! No, organisations can be assessed, audited or reviewed but not formally 'certified' against ISO/IEC 27002 . One reason is that ISO/IEC 27002 lays out general good practices - guidance rather than prescriptive requirements. Certification auditors would therefore have to apply their judgement and discretion when checking conformity with the standard, which is evidently beyond some of them. In truth, the variation that would arise in practice to reflect each organisation’s specific context and information security needs would detract from the value of a generic certification scheme. Context is all-important. An organisation can be reviewed informally or even audited against ISO/IEC 27002 by competent technology auditors, consultants or experienced information security professionals familiar with ISO27k : this is the “gap analysis” activity common to many ISMS implementations. Information security controls currently in operation in the organisation are compared against those recommended by ISO/IEC 27001 , looking for gaps that will probably have to be addressed at some point during the ISMS implementation project (if the missing controls are judged necessary to mitigate the organisation's identified, evaluated and unacceptable information risks). ISO/IEC 27001 lays out a formal specification for an Information Security Management System . The management system element of an ISMS is more easily specified in a generic yet formal way than the information security controls which differ substantially between organisations and industries and vary over time, and therefore ISO/IEC 27001 is the standard against which organisations are formally certified. This does however leave us with a problem: how can organisations place confidence in the actual information security controls of their business partners? Their ISO/IEC 27001 certificate only tells us that they have a working and compliant management system, and we assume that therefore they have assessed their information risks, implemented appropriate information security controls, and are proactively managing them ... well in fact that’s quite a lot of assurance when you think about it. Business partners can still opt to disclose more information about their actual information security controls, for example by sharing their information security policy manuals or by permitting third parties to audit their information security controls (perhaps using ISO/IEC TS 27008 ). How do we get an ISO27001 certificate? Establish contact with accredited certification auditors as soon as you like. They don’t bite and most will happily answer basic questions about the audits and certification process if it leads to business for them and a smoother audit for both of you in the long run. First obtain and read the core standards: ISO/IEC 27000 combines a glossary with an outline of the whole ISO27k series - useful for explaining to management; ISO/IEC 27001 , the ‘certification standard’, formally specifies the I nformation S ecurity M anagement S ystem; ISO/IEC 27002 is a catalogue of information security controls; ISO/IEC 27005 explains the process of managing information risks. Next comes information risk analysis . Set the scene with management, then line-up the relevant parts of the organisation and people to engage with the process. They should be reasonably open to the concept of improving their information security controls and you will probably have to engage suitable risk and security experts to make this process as painless and effective as possible. The risk analysis may be called a 'gap analysis' or 'ISO27k review' since it may make sense to compare your existing controls against the advice in the standard, looking for weaknesses and omissions as you go, or you may prefer to do a zero-base risk analysis, assuming that there are no controls in place. The advantage of the latter approach is that you might identify unnecessary controls that can perhaps be deinstalled later. By the way, 'the relevant parts of the organisation' relates to the scope of your intended certification. You have the option to certify the whole enterprise or specific parts. Scoping is a critical management decision. Work closely with senior management to clarify what is in and out of scope of the ISMS, with the important proviso that everything declared as out-of-scope is inherently untrusted from the perspective of the in-scope elements, therefore suitable security controls (both technical and non-technical e.g. contracts or SLAs) are probably needed for data flows, systems, networks, processes etc . that cross the scope boundary. Minimising the scope is not necessarily the easy option it may seem! Having completed the analysis, you face the challenge of persuading senior management to invest in information security, explaining the issues and risks that the analysis identified in terms they appreciate. This is a tricky balancing act: over-egg your dire predictions and they may back away saying you are being sensationalist. Underplay the security issues and they may not pay sufficient attention to the need for security improvements. It really helps to lean on someone with prior experience in this area. Management's appetite for addressing the issues you identify will determine the financing and priorities for the next step. Hint: if management flatly declares 'No!' at this point, be sure your warnings, recommendations and funding requests are explicit and confirm their refusal (obtaining and retaining written evidence) and, aside from reviewing whatever you have said, perhaps reconsider your career options. With management backing, you now implement the security improvements. Easier said than done! It could be a mere formality if your setup is already very security aware and competent in this area. It could be an extremely arduous job if you are starting from a low base, such as an organisation which has habitually underinvested in information security, has made strategic changes in its use of, and dependence on, IT (e.g. it has started using the Internet for business processes/transactions and communications, rather than simply for promotional websites), or where there are no clear accountabilities for information security. It is impossible for me - or indeed for you - to say how long or how costly this phase will be for you until you have completed the previous steps, and even then you can only estimate. With the improvements well under way and security gradually becoming an inherent part of business-as-usual, it's time to think forward towards ISO/IEC 27001 certification. Like other ISO management systems standards, ISO/IEC 27001 is process-focused - it specifies a 'management system' for information security comprising a suite of management processes. Certification involves contacting a suitable accredited certification body to review your I nformation S ecurity M anagement S ystem ... I'm sure there's more to it. What is really involved in being certified? Genuine management support is essential . It is futile to attempt an ISMS implementation without it. Time invested in explaining to managers what the ISMS is and more importantly how it benefits the organisation is time well spent. Listen hard to find out what managers really need from information security and pick up opportunities for strategic alignment. If the ISMS supports or enables key business objectives, it is less likely to be seen as an impediment to progress, and is harder for reluctant managers to resist. The main activities are as follows: Get management support - easier said than done! This typically involves raising management’s awareness of the costs and benefits of having an ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS. A great way to start is to raise management’s awareness of some of the key current information risks and good practice controls (perhaps drawn from ISO/IEC 27002 ) that are not yet in place, through a “gap analysis” (an outline risk assessment and overview of the work needed to achieve conformity) followed by a business case and/or strategy for the security improvement (ISMS implementation) program. Define ISMS scope - what businesses, business units, departments and/or systems are going to be covered by your I nformation S ecurity M anagement S ystem? Inventory your information assets - although not essential, a reasonable inventory or list of information systems, networks, databases, data items, documents etc . will be used in various ways e.g. to confirm that the ISMS scope is appropriate, identify business-critical and other especially valuable or vulnerable assets, nominate their owners etc . Conduct an information risk assessment - ideally using a recognised formal method but a custom process may be acceptable if applied methodically. Prepare a S tatement o f A pplicability - according to ISO/IEC 27000 , the SoA is a “documented statement describing the control objectives [now known as purposes] and controls that are relevant and applicable to the organisation’s ISMS”. Which of the control purposes and controls from ISO/IEC 27002 are applicable to your ISMS, and which are irrelevant, not appropriate or otherwise not required? Document these management decisions in your SoA; and in parallel … Prepare a R isk T reatment P lan - ISO/IEC 27000 describes the RTP as “a plan that identifies the appropriate management actions, resources, responsibilities, timeliness and priorities for managing information security risks”. Develop ISMS implementation program - given the scale, it is generally appropriate to think in terms of an overall program of individual projects to implement various parts of ISO/IEC 27002 , for example one or two projects for each of the main sections of the standard. Which resources can you call upon, direct, use, borrow or persuade to build or supplement your core ISMS implementation team? You will probably need experienced information security professionals (particularly a team leader) and support from related functions such as Internal Audit, Risk Management, Legal/compliance, HR, Finance and Marketing, not just IT. You are advised to plan the work in risk-priority-order where possible i.e. tackle the biggest risks early so that, whatever happens to your program of work in practice, it has had a good go at knocking down the main issues and can demonstrate real progress, even if it then falters for some reason. Also, early wins are a source of helpful positive feedback: this is an important aspect to the program which as to be seen to be effective by management, as well as actually being effective. If all the program does is interfere with business, annoy managers and cost a packet, it is hardly going to be on the shortlist of “things we really must keep doing next year”! Execute the ISMS implementation program - through the individual project plans, the implementation team sets to work to implement the controls identified in the RTP. Conventional program and project management practices are required here, meaning proper governance, planning, budgeting, progress reporting, project risk management and so forth. If the program is large, seek professional program management assistance. Operate the ISMS - as each project in the program fills in part of the ISMS, it hands over a suite of operational security management systems and processes, accompanied by a comprehensive set of policies, standards, procedures, guidelines etc . Operating the ISMS has to be an ongoing routine activity for the organisation: this is not a one-shot project! The Information Security Management function needs to be established, funded and directed, and many other changes are likely to be required throughout the organisation as information security becomes part of the routine. Collect ISMS operational artefacts - the ISMS comprises your framework of security policies, standards, procedures, guidelines etc ., and it routinely generates and uses security logs, log review reports, firewall configuration files, risk assessment reports etc . ... all of which should be retained and managed. These artefacts are crucial evidence that the ISMS is operating correctly. Build up sufficient artefacts to prove to the auditors that the system is operating, stable and effective. Audit the ISMS - internal auditing of the ISMS will be a routine part of it. The idea is to have competent and independent reviewers (ideally trained and experienced technology auditors) take a good look at the ISMS, review the evidence (ISMS operational artefacts plus other documentation such as information security policies and procedures), consider that in relation to the risks and opportunities to the organisation, and make recommendations. Conformity with the formal requirements of ISO/IEC 27001 (see the next step) may be a major part of the audits but a competent tech auditor will generally be more interested in how well the ISMS meets the organisation’s business requirements as a whole: gaining an ISO/IEC 27001 certificate is probably just one of several business reasons for implementing the ISMS and investing in information security management. Identifying and addressing the organisation’s information risks in a structured, systematic, comprehensive, prioritised and coherent manner is the bigger goal. Check conformity - are you actually doing what you said you were going to do? ISO/IEC 27002 covers conformity with internal requirements (corporate policies etc .) and compliance with mandatory obligations (such as laws and industry regulations). The ISMS itself needs to incorporate assurance activities generating, for instance, post-incident reports and corrective actions arising. Undertake corrective actions - to improve the ISMS and address risks. The ‘management system’ part of the ISMS should result in continuous alignment between business requirements, information risks and capabilities for information security. As with quality management systems, the idea is to give management a means of controlling information security management processes systematically such that they can be continually monitored and improved, not least because perfect security is an unattainable goal in any real-world situation. Conduct a pre-certification assessment - when the ISMS has stabilised, an accredited certification body or other trusted, competent and independent advisor is invited by management to check whether the ISMS is functioning correctly. This is largely an assessment of the ISMS documentation and readiness to be audited fully. It is a golden opportunity for your organisation to identify and tie off any remaining loose ends before the actual certification audit. It’s also a low-stress way to get to know the auditors. Certification audit - an accredited body conducts a conformity assessment (certification audit), checking that the ISMS fully satisfies the mandatory requirements in the main-body clauses of ISO/IEC 27001 . The auditors will check evidence such as the SoA, RTP, operational artefacts etc . and will attempt to confirm that the ISMS (a) is suitable and sufficient to meet the organisation’s information security requirements in theory i.e. it is correctly specified; and (b) actually meets the requirements in practice i.e . it is operating as specified and documented. Party party - seriously, getting certified marks the end of the implementation phase, a substantial milestone for the team and the organisation so celebrate your success. You’ve earned it! More than that, your ISO/IEC 27001 certificate is a valuable business asset. The organisation should be proud of what it has achieved, knowing of course that information security is never really “done” ... Operate the ISMS - it should be business as usual now. Other things to consider as your ISMS settles becomes routine and gradually matures include (1) taking a good look at the information risks and security arrangements in place elsewhere in your business network: are your suppliers, partners and customers also certified? Are they certifiable? Do they need your encouragement? (2) Using and maturing your security metrics to continue identifying and making improvements. (3) If you haven’t already done so, please join the ISO27k Forum to share your experience with others and participate in the global community. Annual surveillance audits – your certification auditors keep an eye on the ISMS to make sure the certificate remains valid, leading to … 3-yearly full recertification – essentially another certification audit (conformity assessment) takes place after 3 years. What does ISO 27001 certification involve? What happens? Who does what and when? Like exams, certification audits get more familiar if not easier with practice. Various reviews and assessments, ISMS internal audits and certification audits are all opportunities to learn about the process as well as sources of information about areas needing improvement. During and after the process, talk to managers and others involved in the process about how things are going, and share any good news. We’d love to hear how it went on the ISO27k Forum for instance! Treated sensibly, these are all valuable opportunities to confirm that your ISMS is and remains effective, and to pick up benchmarking tips from the consultants and auditors with experience of other organisations. The ISO/IEC 27001 conformity assessment and certification process is very similar to other ISO management systems such as ISO 9001. It is an external audit of the organisation’s ISMS (I nformation S ecurity M anagement S ystem) in three main phases: Pre-audit - having engaged an accredited certification body, they will request copies of your ISMS documentation (SoA, RTP, policy etc .) and may request a short on-site visit to introduce themselves and identify contacts for the next phase. When you are ready, the certification audit will be scheduled by mutual agreement - typically a few weeks later. Certification audit - this is the audit fieldwork. One or more auditors from the accredited certification body will come on site, work their way systematically through their audit checklists, checking things. They will check your ISMS policies, standards and procedures against the requirements identified in ISO/IEC 27001 , and also seek evidence that people follow the documentation in practice (i.e . the auditors’ favourite “Show me!”). They will gather and assess evidence including artefacts produced by the ISMS processes (such as records authorising certain users to have certain access rights to certain systems, or minutes of management meetings confirming approval of policies) or by directly observing ISMS processes in action, and by interviewing relevant people. Post-audit - having analysed and considered the findings, the results of the audit will be reported formally to management. Depending on how the audit went and the auditors’ standard audit processes, they will typically raise the following (in increasing severity): Observation or O pportunity F or I mprovement - these are niggles, minor concerns or potential future issues that management is well advised to consider; Minor N on-C onformity - these are more significant concerns that the organisation has to address at some point as a condition of the certificate being granted. The certification body is essentially saying that the organisation does not follow ISO/IEC 27001 in some way, but they do not consider that failing to be a significant weakness or flaw in the ISMS. The certification body may or may not make recommendations on how to fix them. They may or may not check formally that minor nonconformities are resolved, perhaps relying instead on self-reporting by the organisation. They may also be willing to agree a timescale for resolution that continues beyond the point of issue of the certificate, but either way they will almost certainly want to confirm that everything was resolved at the time of the next surveillance or certification audit; Major N on-C onformity - these are the show-stoppers, significant issues that mean the ISO/IEC 27001 conformity certificate cannot be issued until they are resolved . The certification body may suggest how to resolve them and will require positive proof that such major issues have been fully resolved before issuing the certificate. The audit fieldwork may even be suspended if a major NC is identified in order to give the organisation a chance to fix the issue before continuing. They will also issue your certificate of course, assuming you passed the assessment! Following the initial certification there are annual follow-ups (“surveillance audits” or “C ontinual A ssessment V isits”). Conformity certificates are valid for three years so there is a full recertification every three years, with two smaller check-ups in between. There is more information about this in the standards ... or you can simply ask the auditors, or Google, or turn to the ISO27k Forum ... Is ISO 27001 status binary: compliant vs. noncompliant? Experienced auditors know the standards well and see many organisations struggling with various aspects, so they can often spot issues and maybe even suggest solutions that the organisations themselves may fail to see. There are ‘degrees of compliance’ (or conformity) with ALL laws, rules, regulations and standards ... but not as far as the laws, rules, regs and standards themselves, and perhaps the authorities normally behind them, are concerned. ISO/IEC 27001 for instance is worded as if organisations absolutely must fully satisfy all the mandatory requirements for the management system . The intention was to leave no wiggle-room, no subjectivity, no doubt about it. When certifying an organisation in practice, however, the certification auditors will accept all the management system elements or processes that fully conform with the standard, and will consider and discuss with management any aspects that are not quite so clearly or fully conformant, before making a decision as to whether or not to issue the certificate. More likely, they will specify what must be addressed (“major N on-C onformities”) and verified before they will issue the certificate, plus other things that should be addressed (“minor NCs ” and niggly “observations ” or "O pportunities f or I mprovement"). At the end of the day – which may be some weeks after the certification audit once they are satisfied that all major NCs are fixed - the certification auditors must decide whether the standard’s requirements are sufficiently satisfied to issue or renew a conformity certificate. It is natural to focus on whichever aspects of the standard are most challenging. The auditors may probe more deeply into those same areas if there are concerns, but occasionally organisations are tripped up by things that seem relatively straightforward: this is where the auditors’ independence, competence and empathy come into play. Who can certify us? Find your accreditation body through the IAF . Contact the accreditation body for details of the CBs they have accredited for ISO/IEC 27001 that cover your part/s of the world. Almost anyone. You can even do it yourself! However, the certificate only has real meaning and value to third parties if it is issued by a recognised C ertification B ody (known as registrars etc . in some countries), which in practice means a CB that has been accredited by a recognised accreditation organisation. “Accredited” means their certification practices have been checked to ensure that the conformity assessment processes, and hence the certificates issued, are sound, legitimate, trustworthy and meaningful. If certificates were issued by anyone who felt like it, the certificates and potentially ISO27k as a whole would soon lose value and be discredited. The formality in the process builds and maintains confidence and trust. The accreditation process or scheme (i.e . checking that CBs are competent and suitable to assess clients against ISO/IEC 27001 ) is the subject of ISO/IEC 27006 . For more info, see the website for the I nternational A ccreditation F orum – a global industry body independent of both ISO and IEC. Aside from CBs, individual auditors may be accredited by bodies such as the I nternational R egister of C ertificated A uditors . They generally work for large consultancies or system integrators, though some are self-employed or work in small companies. How do we choose a certification body? Be sure the contract with your chosen CB incorporates a suitable nondisclosure, confidentiality or privacy clause. An ISMS CB can hardly object to you taking an interest in their information security arrangements ... and they might just give you credit for asking! Identifying potential CBs is straightforward using Google and checking who issued certificates to others in your industry or locales. Choosing a CB is much like selecting any service supplier, so you should follow your standard vendor selection, procurement and contracting practices. In short, figure out what you want (your criteria), review available service offerings on the market against the criteria, select the best fit and then make the purchase (negotiate and contract for their services). Here are some criteria to consider: Vendor quality or standing, in particular whether they are duly accredited (see below) and have a solid reputation with a track record of success in this niche; General vendor selection criteria such as their ethics, policies and practices for health and safety, equality, corporate responsibility, environment etc .; Technical competence, qualifications and experience of the ISMS auditors to be assigned to the job (does the CB specialise both in your industry and in ISO/IEC 27001 ? Are their auditors qualified, competent and experienced? If your organisation has adopted multiple ISO management systems, does the CB cover all of them, and would they be willing to conduct multi-standard audits in parallel, at reduced cost?); Their working practices, procedures etc . (e.g . will they permit your ISMS internal auditors to shadow and support their auditors? Are they willing to be flexible on the timing if you are uncertain of being ready in time? How soon after the audit is successfully completed will they issue the certificate?); The quality, breadth and utility of their reports and other outputs (aside from the formal certificate, you may for example find value in the completed assessment checklists or improvement suggestions and advice from the CB auditors if they will share them with your management or ISMS internal auditors); Value for money (there’s more to this than price! Check the details of the services they offer, the pricing/charging terms, and the overall value promise); Availability e.g. timescales within which they can schedule and complete the job; Past performance e.g. in previous jobs for your organisation, credible customer references, or suggestions from industry peers, local contacts or other auditors and trusted advisors; Their information security and privacy arrangements. ISMS auditors should have the professional knowledge and expertise to protect your sensitive information, but since they will be given privileged access to your organisation's ISMS (and perhaps to the facilities and other assets) you need to assess the information risks and treat them in the normal way. It’s up to your management to determine whether these risks are material in relation to the information risks associated with other suppliers, business partners, customers etc ., and various other business risks, and so whether and how to treat them. Check the vendors’ marketing and sales collateral for differences in their proposed approaches, and consider the overall package on offer. The accreditation status of your chosen CB is important if you are expecting your ISO/IEC 27001 certificate to be credible to, and hence trusted by, third parties such as your suppliers and business partners. Third parties who plan to rely on the certificate normally insist on certificates issued by CBs that are independent, competent and trustworthy. In practice, this means the CB must have been properly accredited by trustworthy accreditation bodies such as the UK A ccreditation S ervice or others recognised by the I nternational A ccreditation F orum . To be accredited by recognised accreditation bodies, CBs are formally assessed or audited against applicable, internationally recognised standards regarding their competence, impartiality and capability. Accreditation reduces the possibility of selecting an incompetent CB, and substantially increases the value of the certificate. Oh and by the way, don’t forget to confirm their actual accreditation status with the accreditation body and check that the accreditation body is recognised by the IAF , as anyone may claim to have been accredited. It’s a jungle out there. ISO/IEC TS 17021-1 lays out the principles and requirements for the competence, consistency and impartiality of the audit and certification of management systems of all types (such as management systems for quality, environmental protection and information security), while ISO/IEC 27006 offers additional, more specific advice for ISMS CBs. Legitimate, duly-accredited ISO/IEC 27001 CBs are forbidden from auditing customers of their ISMS-related consultancy services in order to avoid the obvious conflict of interest. Your ISMS implementation consultants and advisors may, however, be able to help you find and select suitable CBs if you wish. Previous Up Next

Back Up Next ISO/IEC 27561 ISO/IEC 27561:2024 — Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Privacy operationalisation model and method for engineering (POMME) ( first edition) Up Abstract “This guidance document [ISO/IEC 27561] describes a model and method to operationalize the privacy principles specified in ISO/IEC 29100 into sets of controls and functional capabilities. The method is described as a process that builds upon ISO/IEC/IEEE 24774. [ISO/IEC 27561] is designed for use in conjunction with relevant privacy and security standards and guidance which impact privacy operationalization. It supports networked, interdependent applications and systems. [ISO/IEC 27561] is intended for engineers and other practitioners developing systems controlling or processing personally identifiable information.” [Source: ISO/IEC 27561:2024] Introduction The standard presents a systematic approach for engineering IT systems to satisfy privacy and personal data protection requirements, drawing on the 11 privacy principles expressed in ISO/IEC 29100 privacy framework plus ISO/IEC TR 27550 and ISO/IEC TR 27555 privacy engineering for system lifecycle processes. Scope The standard is intended to help ‘privacy engineers’ (or system architects or technical managers) interpret and satisfy the privacy requirements expressed in policies etc . plus those that emerge in the course of further analysis and development. It lays out a structured analytical method and model based on OASIS, emphasising functional architecture and practical implementation of privacy engineering. The process involves elaborating on privacy risks and designing controls, capabilities required plus the functions and mechanisms to deliver them. Structure Main clauses: 5: Context of privacy operationalization - background to the model and approach. 6: Initial information inventory process - an iterative personal information inventory process including determination of the domains, processes, systems and data flows. 7: Privacy controls, privacy control requirements, capabilities, risk assessment and iteration process - determination and documentation of the required controls, functions, mechanisms etc. 8: Privacy capabilities - essentially the governance arrangements for addressing privacy. Annex A: Mapping of the privacy principles from ISO/IEC 29100 to POMME capabilities. Annex B: Lifecycle process example involving a PII controller and a solution provider. Annex C: POMME capability functions and mechanisms in a consumer application use case. Status The current first edition was published in 2024 . Commentary Despite the contrived title and nasty neologism ‘operationalization’, the standard’s systematic, structured approach should prove useful for privacy specialists. Up Up Up This page last updated: 19 August 2026

Detailed answers to a bunch of Frequently Asked Questions about the ISO/IEC 27000-series information security standards ISO27k FAQ This unusually detailed FAQ poses and addresses F requently A sked Q uestions regarding ISO27k, the ISO/IEC 27000 standards. There is a lot to say, lots of pragmatic advice to offer. FAQ topics About the ISO27k standards Implementing the standards Managing information risks ISO27k documentation Assurance ISMS maturity A gentle introduction to the information security standards Guidance on interpreting and applying the standards in practice Tips on identifying, analysing, evaluating and treating the risks Required documents - SoA, RTP, policies, procedures, records ...? Guidance on auditing and certification for confidence and trust Ideas on using continual improvement to embed and mature your ISMS