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ISO/IEC 27071


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ISO/IEC 27071 — Cybersecurity — Security recommendations for establishing trusted connections between devices and services
[DRAFT]

 

Abstract

[TBA]
 

Introduction

This standard concerns mutual authentication between distributed network devices (such as sensors and other IoT things) and [cloud-based] information services, using Public Key Infrastructure and Hardware Security Modules.

 

Scope of the standard

The standard will lay out a conceptual framework for establishing trusted connections between devices and services based on HSMs with recommendations roots of trust, identity, authentication and key establishment, remote attestation, data integrity and authenticity.

 

Content of the standard

Just 28 pages with 2 main sections:

    5. Framework and components for establishing a trusted connection: concepts and architectures.
     

    6. Security recommendations for establishing a trusted connection: succinct statements of the information and physical security controls required.
     

    ... plus three annexes briefly covering [deliberate] threats; ‘solutions’ [non-aqueous]; and an example [securely connecting a mobile device to an information service].

 

Status of the standard

Status update January The standard is at Final Draft International Standard stage.

It is due to be published during 2023.

 

Personal comments

Here is a fictitious scenario illustrating the need for mutual authentication. Imagine your electric car maintains detailed technical data about the places its has been driven to, the manner of driving, battery performance etc. You agree to share the data routinely with the vehicle manufacturer through a 4G or 5G connection to a car monitoring app, in return for a warranty extension, driving tips or advanced warning of issues requiring a service visit. How does the manufacturer know the data uploaded by your car is, in fact, your car, not a cloned or modified vehicle? How does your car know that the car monitoring app is, in fact, the car monitoring app run by the manufacturer, not some naughty hacker intent on discovering your movements and habits for blackmail or kidnap, or another car manufacturer snooping on its competitor’s technology, or an agent for the insurance companies illicitly checking on your driving competence and hence risk profile?

 

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